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Abstract: This article critically engages with debates on uneven and combined development and 
particularly the lack of attention given in this literature to accounts of spatial diversity in capitalism’s 
outward expansion as well as issues of Eurocentrism. Through interlocutions with Antonio Gramsci 
on his theorising of state formation and capitalist modernity and the notion of passive revolution, 
we draw out the internal relationship between the structuring condition of uneven and combined 
development and the class agency of passive revolution. Interlocuting with passive revolution places 
Antonio Gramsci firmly within a stream of classic social theory shaping considerations of capitalist 
modernity. As a result, by building on cognate theorising elsewhere, passive revolution can then be 
established as a lateral field of causality that necessarily grasps spatio-temporal dynamics linked to both 
state and subaltern class practices of transformation in social property relations, situated within the 
structuring conditions of uneven and combined development. 
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This article seeks to engage three lines of criticism in the literature around uneven and combined 
development. First, that there is no fully reconstructed theory within the original approach to 
uneven and combined development and, by extension, contemporary approaches to uneven and 
combined development have not been adequate in ‘accounting for both the spatio-temporal dynamics 
of capitalist development and the causal effects of socio-political multiplicity’ (Rioux 2015: 494, 
original emphasis). The danger here, in the useful framing by Sébastien Rioux (2015: 494), is that the 
theory of uneven and combined development is ‘nothing more than a friendly reminder about the 
importance of “the international”’. Second, for some time, David Harvey (1982/2006: xix) has 
prominently opined that historical materialism cannot exist without a solid appreciation of the 
dialectics of spatio-temporality, hence the agenda-setting advancement of historical-geographical 
materialism. Yet it is perplexing that much of the recent literature within historical sociology is 
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aspatial (Hesketh and Morton, 2014: 150). There is a failure to develop an internal dialectical 
perspective on the relationship between the ‘political’ state and the ‘economic’ modalities of 
exploitation. Third, this opens up the need to recognise and then focus on what Ernest Mandel 
called the ‘historical detour’, in order to consider how the unfolding of capitalism occurred within 
societies of socio-economically uneven and combined developmental conditions (Mandel, 
1976/1990: 85). Put differently, without the concrete analysis of the spatio-temporal dynamics of 
uneven and combined development, debates have been presently coy in delivering place-based 
accounts of the historical detour that capitalism has taken in time and space (see Matin, 2013 for an 
exception). The result is that ‘we are left with the important identification of a lateral field of causality, 
without the latter being incorporated within social theory’ (Rioux, 2015: 485, original emphasis). The 
originality of this article is, then, that it asserts the notion of passive revolution as precisely a lateral field 
of causality capable of grasping spatio-temporal dynamics linked to state and class practices of 
transformation in social property relations within the overriding structuring condition of uneven and 
combined development.  
When conceptualising the relation between the structuring condition of uneven and 
combined development and class interventions of passive revolution, we draw on the philosophy of 
internal relations (Ollman, 1976), allowing us to tease out the internal dynamics of structure and 
agency in capitalist expansion. Thus, starting the analysis from how capitalist production is organised 
around the private ownership of the means of production and ‘free’ wage labour, ‘it is this 
understanding, which generates the key ontological properties of structure and agency. First, there 
are the structuring conditions of capitalism, the way production and accumulation of surplus value is 
set up. At the same time, these social relations of production also engender social class forces as the 
key collective agents’ (Bieler and Morton, 2018: 37-8). In the next section, we discuss, first, how the 
structuring condition of uneven and combined development can be understood without falling into 
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the trap of Eurocentric diffusionism. This will then be further developed through an engagement 
with Antonio Gramsci by outlining the internal relation between class interventions linked to 
processes of passive revolution uncovering the varied spatial dynamics in capitalism’s outward 
expansion. In other words, the argument reveals passive revolution as an affinal concept to uneven 
and combined development, which delivers a field of causality that captures expressions of state and 
class agency internally related to the structuring condition of uneven and combined development 
(Morton, 2011/2013: 35-9, 237-51; Morton, 2017a; also see Hesketh, 2017b). 
 
The multilinear dialectic of uneven and combined development 
With capitalism, production is organised around the private ownership of the means of production 
and ‘free’ wage labour, which results in a number of structuring conditions. First, not only workers 
but also capital are constantly compelled to reproduce themselves, which generates a constant 
emphasis on competitiveness and a related pressure for further technological innovation in a 
relentless struggle for ever higher profit levels. As Marx (1867/1990: 381) noted, ‘under free 
competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a 
coercive force external to him’. Nevertheless, what works for the individual capitalist, is problematic 
for capital as a whole. With more goods produced but fewer workers employed, there is a lack of 
demand for these goods. ‘We see here’, Harvey argues, ‘the necessary contradiction that arises when 
each capitalist strives to reduce the share of variable capital in value added within the enterprise 
while speculating on selling his output to workers employed by other capitalists’ (Harvey, 
1982/2006: 134). Hence, capitalism is structurally crisis-prone.  
Rosa Luxemburg recognised the inevitable tensions between expanded reproduction of 
capitalism and limited demand constantly driving capital towards outward expansion to secure new 
markets and cheaper raw materials and labour (Bieler et al., 2016). Famously, in The Accumulation of 
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Capital, by analysing the creation and expansion of the hothouse conditions for capital accumulation 
in non-capitalist environments, Luxemburg concluded that ‘from the very beginning, the forms and 
laws of capitalist production aim to comprise the entire globe as a store of productive forces’ 
(Luxemburg, 1913/2003: 401). Luxemburg’s first focus is on processes of primitive accumulation in 
dispossessing peasant producers to create a reserve of labour power based on the wage system in 
non-capitalist territories. Second, militarism was also famously traced by Luxemburg (1913/2003: 
419) as ‘the executor of the accumulation of capital,’ as a province of the expansion of capital in 
gaining possession of the means of production and labour power through colonialism and 
imperialism (Luxemburg, 1913/2003: 367). As historical examples, Luxemburg mentions British 
policy in India, French policy in Algeria, and the extension of commodity relations by European 
powers in China (Luxemburg, 1913/2003: 367). Finally, Luxemburg discussed the role of 
international loans and the credit system, the role of the built environment and fixed capital, as an 
essential spatial arrangement for the absorption of surplus value (e.g. through railroad building, 
roads, dams, irrigation systems, warehouses, schools, hospitals, universities). For Luxemburg, then, 
capitalist production for a world market has gone hand in hand with decimation, mass murders, 
slave trade and extermination in the Americas, Australia, North Africa, West Africa and China 
(Luxemburg 1915/1972: 112, 147). 
Granting a privileged focus on the spatial system of Europe without making connections 
between intertwined histories that lie both within and beyond the European context can, however, 
be defined as Eurocentrism. While the periphery of non-Europe is often portrayed as a passive 
recipient of diffusions from the European core, the modern expansion of capitalism is often 
presented in some circles largely in terms of internal, immanent forces (Blaut, 1999: 130-2). It is 
beyond the scope of this article to deliver any resolution to the debates on the spectre of 
Eurocentrism that has curbed recognition of the role of non-European states and societies in the 
5 
 
constitution of capitalism and the states-system (see Anievas and Matin, 2016; Anievas and 
Nişançıoglu, 2015; Bhambra, 2007; Chakrabarty, 2007; Chibber, 2013; Nişançıoglu, 2013; Tansel, 
2015; Tansel, 2016). Nevertheless, the critique of ‘Eurocentric diffusionism’, the problem of 
examining capitalism through the notion of uneven and combined development as a wave of 
diffusion unfolding outward from western Europe to the non-European periphery (Blaut, 1993), has 
to be addressed. ‘It is therefore crucial to reflect further on whether an account of the rise of 
capitalism and the modern state can avoid the perils of Eurocentrism’ (Morton, 2005: 517). In order 
to overcome Eurocentrism, the goal is to avoid positing the non-West as ontologically exterior to 
the constitution of capitalism (Tansel, 2015: 78).  
In the following, we respond to the charge of Eurocentrism in two ways. First, we 
contribute to busting the myth that Marx projected a linear causality or progressive movement from 
capital’s becoming in one specific temporal and spatial instance to its universalisation throughout the 
world. Second, we empirically illustrate how the emergence and outward expansion of capitalism 
from England and the Low Countries was heavily conditioned by their insertion within “the 
international”. As for the former, there is a strong multilinear understanding of social development 
directly evident in Marx that reveals the wider geographical scope of his critique of political 
economy (Anderson, 2010: 197). Equally, ‘deprovincialising Marx entails not simply an expanded 
geographic inclusion but a broadening of temporal possibilities unchained from a hegemonic 
unilateralism’ (Harootunian, 2015: 2). This endeavour pivots on a re-reading of the statement by 
Marx that ‘the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the 
image of its own future’ (Marx, 1867/1990: 91), which is interpreted as having a form of unilinear 
determinism built into it (Shanin, 1983: 4). However, Derek Sayer and Philip Corrigan (1983: 79, 
original emphasis) have argued that the comparative analysis here is between England and Germany. 
Since Germany is a society in which capitalism has taken root already, its “normal 
development” can reasonably be expected to follow an “English” path. But this in no way 
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implies any necessity for societies in which capitalist production is not already established to 
do the same. 
There is, therefore, a multilinear theory of history evident here that contains a focus on the 
dialectical unity of the inneraction of particularity and universality within social development that 
needs to be recovered within and for historical materialism (Anderson, 2010: 178-9). This is 
evidenced very well in Marx: 
It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one 
another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. Their sequence 
is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is 
precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to 
historical development. The point is not the historic position of the economic relations in 
the succession of different forms of society . . . Rather, their order within modern bourgeois 
society (Marx, 1857-58/1973: 107-8).   
 Envisioning capitalism as creating a form of unevenness that combines both the general and 
the particular is also of a piece with provincialising Europe and deprovincialising Marx (Chakrabarty, 
2007; Harootunian, 2015). For Harry Harootunian this entails emphasising the process of 
unevenness embedded in capital’s continuous expansion across heterogeneous temporalities and 
spaces. Referring to Marx on the lever of primitive accumulation: 
The history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different countries, and runs 
through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different historical 
epochs. Only in England, which we therefore take as our example, has it the classic form 
(Marx, 1867/1990: 876). 
Hence, this is not to argue that such expropriations outside Europe follow a linear causality, a 
singularly progressive movement, in the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production. ‘Attention 
to the different ways capitalism developed in singular and specific sites affirms Marx’s decision to 
privilege the global theatre reflected in the formation of the world market as the principal organising 
principle in envisioning any possible world history (Harootunian, 2015: 19-20). Capital’s process of 
becoming, through its own spatial and temporal expansion, was therefore an uneven developmental 
process that absorbed and combined previously non-capitalist elements within and across the 
peripheries of Euro-America. Trajectories of state formation are therefore embedded in the uneven 
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world-wide spread of capitalism combined with the condition of differently constituted preceding 
political forms and social relations. Trotsky recognised this multilinear causality, when he developed 
the notion of uneven and combined development. ‘It is false that world economy is simply a sum of 
national parts of one and the same type . . . In reality, the national peculiarities represent an original 
combination of the basic features of the world process’ (Trotsky, 1929/2004: 23). ‘Unevenness’, in 
his regard, ‘is the most general law of the historic process [that] reveals itself most sharply and 
complexly in the destiny of the backward countries’ (Trotsky, 1936/1980: 28). Due to the 
unevenness of the developmental process, features appropriate to different historical periods 
become combined within the character of a social formation. Therefore a ‘peculiar mixture of 
backward elements with the most modern factors’ arises within a social formation confronted with 
insertion into the expanding system of capitalism (Trotsky, 1936/1980: 31-2, 36, 72).  
It was Marx who recognised that ‘the capitalist mode of production is conditioned by modes 
of production lying outside its own stage of development’ (Marx, 1884/1992: 190). The circulation 
of capital is therefore characterised by ‘the many-sided character of its origins’ and conditioned by 
the existence of the world market, whether that be in relation to the forms of existence of 
productive capital, money capital, or commodity capital. Within the decisive prevailing social 
conditions of capitalist production, then, Marx has this important remark that is worth quoting at 
length. 
Whether the commodities are the products of production based on slavery, the product of 
peasants (Chinese, Indian ryots), of a community (Dutch East Indies), of state production 
(such as existed in earlier epochs of Russian history, based on serfdom) or of half-savage 
hunting peoples, etc. — as commodities and money they confront the money and commodities in which 
industrial capital presents itself, and enter both into the latter’s own circuit and into that of the surplus-value 
borne by the commodity capital, in so far as the latter is spent as revenue; i.e. in both branches of 
the circulation of commodity capital. The character of the production process from which they derive is 
immaterial; they function on the market as commodities, and as commodities they enter both the circuit of 




David Harvey, too, highlights this commentary as significant for understanding how capital 
integrates with noncapitalist modes of production, indicating that once commodities enter into the 
orbit of capital they act just like all the others. These insights are therefore a fecund source for 
considerations of uneven geographical development, systems of commodity exchange with 
noncapitalist social formations, and the expansion of the world market having ‘all manner of 
implications for our understanding of how capital becomes grounded in particular situations, 
including those of a noncapitalist world’ (Harvey, 2013: 76-7). 
More recently, Alex Anievas and Kerem Nişançıoglu demonstrate well how the emergence 
of capitalism in England and the Low Countries and its subsequent outward expansion cannot be 
explained by referring exclusively to these countries’, or more generally Europe’s, internal dynamics. 
Rather, both the constitution and outward expansion of capitalism has to be understood by the way 
these countries relied on relationships with non-European space along lines of uneven and 
combined development. First, English capitalism was heavily conditioned by the Atlantic expansion 
following Columbus’s invasion of the Americas in 1492. ‘If it were not for the specifically 
international conditions created by Europe’s expansion into the Atlantic, it is likely that capitalism 
would have been choked off by the limits of English agrarian capitalism’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 
2015: 152). The American colonies provided both markets for surpluses, which could not be sold in 
Britain, as well as super-profits resulting from plantations based on slave labour for re-investment 
into the industrial revolution. ‘In the late eighteenth-century, income from colonial properties in the 
Americas was equal to approximately 50 per cent of British gross investment. Since much of this 
would have been reinvested in British industries, it provided a significant input into British 
industrialisation’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 2015: 164). In other words, the full establishment of the 
capitalist mode of production in England, was conditioned by the opportunities afforded through 
the Atlantic expansion and the combination of wage labour in England with slave labour overseas 
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(Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 2015: 169). As for the Dutch case, the very emergence of capitalism was 
conditioned by “the international”. Farmers in the northern parts of the Low Countries were only 
able to switch to milk and dairy production for the market because they gained access to cheap grain 
imports from the Baltic area from the mid fifteenth-century onward (Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 2015: 
181), where production was based on feudal social relations. In the late sixteenth-century, then, 
Dutch agriculture was increasingly characterised by large farms worked by wage labour. ‘Crucially, 
one outcome of this process was an increase in the demand for labour-power concomitant with a 
reduction in its supply in the seventeeth-century, as population growth could not keep pace with 
economic growth’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 2015: 226). Unlike in Britain, this bottleneck was not 
overcome through rapid technological innovation. Instead, Dutch capitalism drew on the availability 
of labour power in Asia in its expansion. ‘By incorporating labour-power on a global scale, Dutch 
capital acquired a power of expansion it hitherto did not possess’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 2015: 
227). Importantly, rather than occupying territory and levying taxes as feudalist Spain and Portugal 
did in Latin America, Dutch capitalism focused on controlling production processes. ‘Dutch 
preponderance rested on intervening and eventually establishing control over production and thus 
also labour-power. The integration of intra-Asian trade, therefore, ‘facilitated for the first time the 
organisation of ‘a hierarchy of capitals connecting a dispersed mass of labour-power’ on a “global” 
scale’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 2015: 234-5 citing Banaji 2010: 274). Localised resistance was 
crucial in the way this process played out. In order to get a foothold in South Asia, Dutch capitalism 
either integrated into existing networks or relied on blistering violence. At times, surplus labour was 
provided for free as in the case of clove production in Moluccas, while rebellions against clove 
production elsewhere were suppressed with brutal force.  
 Clearly, outward capitalist expansion and the full development of capitalism in Britain and 
the Netherlands was conditioned by the opportunities offered inter alia in the Americas and East 
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Asia. There is the argument that a focus on a set of Eastern inventions and resource portfolios 
(ideas, technologies, institutions) enables a breakout from the cul-de-sac of Eurocentrism (Hobson, 
2011). But this position overlooks the subtle point made by Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995: 37, original 
emphasis) that: 
The crucial issue is not the presence or absence of private property in land as such. China, 
for example, had well-established private landed property from a very early stage . . . The 
important point is the relation between private property and political power, and its 
consequences for the organisation of production and the relation between appropriator and 
producer. The unique characteristic of Western development in this respect is that it is 
marked by the earliest and most complete transfer of political power to private property, and 
therefore also the most thorough, generalised and direct subservience of production to the 
demands of an appropriating class. 
The fact that capitalism was first fully established in Britain and the Netherlands, rather than Spain 
or Portugal, indicates that the prior reconfiguration of the social relations of production around 
wage labour and the private ownership of the means of production in the former social formations 
was crucial for their ability to absorb the opportunities offered by imperialism in other areas of the 
world. ‘Those countries where protocapitalist relations were emerging or had already emerged—
Holland and England—made much more productive use of the bullion than did Spain, which was 
set on a course of empire-expanding geopolitical accumulation congruent with its feudal relations of 
production’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu, 2015: 248). In short, the origin of capitalism is spatially a 
European phenomenon based on the emergence of a particular set of social property relations in 
England and the Netherlands, but one which was conditioned in its emergence and outward 
expansion by opportunities and resistances it encountered elsewhere. 
These aspects are absent from Justin Rosenberg’s projection of uneven and combined 
development as a transhistorical phenomenon and, thus, as intrinsic to the historical process itself 
(Rosenberg, 2006: 309). This is contrary to Trotsky’s own stance that capitalism gains mastery over 
inherited unevenness through methods of its own through seeking new territories and economic 
expansion (Trotksy, 1928/1970: 19-20). What is overlooked is Neil Smith’s argument that ‘uneven 
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development is the systematic geographical expression of the contradictions inherent in the very 
constitution and structure of capital’ and thus unique to capitalism (Smith, 1984/2008: 4). As Kees 
van der Pijl (2015: 61-2) clarifies, uneven and combined development is valid only for capitalism. 
Following Neil Smith (2004: 182): 
A law that explains absolutely “everything in the world” explains nothing, and the fact that 
“nothing develops evenly”, used as a philosophical justification for such a law, reduces it to 
triviality. Dressed in such pretence, it tells us absolutely nothing specific about capitalism, 
imperialism or the present moment of capitalist restructuring. 
To argue, as Rosenberg does, that the theory of uneven and combined development itself ‘captures 
at a general level the sociological characteristics of all development’ (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008: 
80, emphasis added) and that it is able to meet Kenneth Waltz’s requirements for a general theory of 
international relations (Rosenberg, 2013a: 185) indicates a misplaced envy of positivism and 
constitutes a departure from historically specific analysis of modern capitalist political space. 
Following our analysis elsewhere (Morton, 2010b: 215-16; Morton, 2011/2013: 242-3; Bieler, 2013), 
the specific character of uneven and combined development can only be fully grasped through an 
understanding of capitalist social relations of production. Importantly, uneven and combined 
development does not only characterise the historic expansion of capitalism and the incorporation 
of non-capitalist space into capitalist social relations of production. Our argument is that uneven and 
combined development continues to shape the re-configuration of social relations between different 
areas within global capitalism today. 
When analysing the constitution and outward dynamic of capitalism along uneven and 
combined lines it is essential to grasp the spatio-temporal dynamics and causal effects of state and 
class agents in the making of capitalist modernity. This is, however, missing from the literature to 
date. For example, Justin Rosenberg (2013b) references the spatio-temporal character of uneven and 
combined development without examining the organisation of space, the spatial logistics of state 
power, or the contradictions of space. Space is “there” but redundant and unexplored, a mere 
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happenstance of developmental unevenness and combination. Nevertheless, addressing the spatial 
dynamics in capitalism’s outward expansion is crucial for the understanding of the wide variety of 
processes through which capitalism has become constituted in different geographical locations 
around the world. Otherwise, the framework of uneven and combined development can collapse 
into an impoverished historical geography of capitalism unable to explain the involvement of states 
and classes in processes of production and surplus appropriation (Rioux, 2013: 108). It was Michael 
Burawoy (1989: 793) in his illusive statement that recognised ‘where Trotsky’s horizons stop, 
Gramsci’s begin’. Or, in David Harvey’s (2003: 101) usage, ‘the molecular processes of capital 
accumulation operating in space and time generate passive revolutions in the geographical patterning 
of capital accumulation’. In what follows, then, we present processes of passive revolution as 
capable of providing a lateral field of causality to address state and class forms of agency with the 
structuring conditions of uneven and combined development. This will allow us to capture spatial 
diversity in the making of capitalist modernity within the structuring conditions of uneven and 
combined development, emphasising the internal relations between the agency of social class forces 
and the structuring conditions of capitalism. 
 
The passive revolutionary road to capitalist modernity 
With reference to the Italian Risorgimentothe movement for national liberation that culminated in 
the political unification of the country in 1860-61Gramsci introduced a cluster of terms to capture 
the contradictory outcome of the crystallisation of this state formation process. These terms, he 
admitted, were difficult (sometimes impossible) to translate into a foreign language given their 
situatedness in Italian historico-political discourse but they, nevertheless, had entered common 
circulation throughout ‘Europe and the world’ to address a category referring to the creation of 
modern states that ‘was not restricted to Italy’. The Risorgimento therefore represented a fragile 
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combination of Rinascimento—Rinascita—Rinascenza literally meaning ‘renaissance’ and ‘rebirth’ or a 
triptych of revival, rebirth, and reawakening. However, in the same note from the Prison Notebooks, 
Gramsci states that ‘all of these terms express the concept of a return to a condition that had already 
existed before: that is, the concept of an aggressive “ripresa” (“riscossa”) of the nation’s energies or of 
a liberation from a state of servitude in order to return to pristine autonomy (riscatto)’ (Gramsci, 
1996: 387, Q5§136). All these terms express an amalgam of revolt, insurrection, or awakening 
[riscossa] as well as that of revival or renewal [ripresa] in relation to the state formation process of the 
Italian Risorgimento and its territorial, spatial and geographical patterning within wider uneven and 
combined developmental conditions. The Risorgimento was as much a rebirth, or revolution, as a 
restoration in which there was ‘the acceptance, in mitigated and camouflaged forms, of the same 
principles that had been combatted’ (Gramsci, 1996: 389, Q5§138; Gramsci, 1996: 389, Q5§139). 
But, given that Gramsci (1971: 220, Q13§27) recognised that ‘restorations in toto do not exist’, how 
are the contradictions of revolution and restoration conjoined in a way that offers a lateral field of 
causality to the structuring condition of uneven and combined development? What is the essential 
form that is conveyed by these contradictions of revolution and restoration impacting on state 
formation processes beyond the mere form of appearance in time and space in the case of the Italian 
Risorgimento? 
 On the form of appearance of these contradictions in the case of Italy, it was the failure of the 
‘Jacobins’ in the Partito d’Azione led by Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi, among others, to 
establish a programme reflecting the demands of the popular masses and, significantly, the peasantry 
that came to mark the Risorgimento. Instead, challenges were thwarted and changes in property 
relations accommodated due to the Partito Moderato, led by Vincenzo Gioberti and (Count) Camillo 
Benso Cavour, establishing alliances between big landowners in the Mezzogiorno and the northern 
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bourgeoisie, while absorbing opposition in parliament through continually assimilated change (or 
trasformismo) within the current social formation. 
‘The Moderates do not acknowledge the agency of a collective force . . . in the Risorgimento; 
they only recognise single individuals, who are either exalted so that they can be 
appropriated or slandered in order to rupture collective ties (Gramsci, 1996: 110, Q3§125).  
The essential form sustaining the form of appearance of the Risorgimento, though, was the concept 
and condition of passive revolution that can be defined as referring to various concrete historical 
instances when aspects of the social relations of capitalist development are either instituted and/or 
expanded resulting in both a ‘revolutionary’ rupture and ‘restoration’ of social relations. ‘The 
problem’, as Antonio Gramsci (1971: 219, Q13§27) states, ‘is to see whether in the dialectic of 
“revolution/restoration” it is revolution or restoration which predominates’. A passive revolution 
therefore represents a blocked dialectic (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 315), or a condition of rupture in 
which socio-political processes of revolution are at once partially fulfilled and displaced (Callinicos, 
2010: 498). According to Gramsci, after the French Revolution (1789), the emergent bourgeoisie 
there, ‘was able to present itself as an integral “state”, with all the intellectual and moral forces that 
were necessary and adequate to the task of organising a complete and perfect society’ (Gramsci, 
2007: 9, Q6§10). In contrast to the instance of revolutionary rupture in France, other European 
countries went through a series of passive revolutions in which the old feudal classes were not 
destroyed but maintained a political role through state power. As a result, such ‘restorations are 
universally repressive’ (Gramsci, 1996: 40, Q3§41). Hence: 
[The] birth of the modern European states [proceeded] by successive waves of reform rather 
than by revolutionary explosions like the original French one. The “successive waves” were 
made up of a combination of social struggles, interventions from above of the enlightened 
monarchy type, and national wars . . . restoration becomes the first policy whereby social 
struggles find sufficiently elastic frameworks to allow the bourgeoisie to gain power without 
dramatic upheavals, without the French machinery of terror . . . The old feudal classes are 
demoted from their dominant position to a “governing” one, but are not eliminated, nor is 
there any attempt to liquidate them as an organic whole . . . Can this “model” for the creation 
of the modern states be repeated in other conditions? (Gramsci, 1971: 115 Q10II§61). 
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At issue here is not the question of the historical validity of the examples deployed. After all, as 
Gramsci himself noted, ‘historians are by no means of one mind (and it is impossible that they 
should be) in fixing the limits of the group of events which constitutes the French Revolution’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 179-80, Q13§17). Equally, it was acknowledged that there can also be a ‘system of 
interpretations of the Risorgimento’ (Gramsci, 2007: 382, Q8§243). Nevertheless, it was concluded 
that: 
The important thing is to analyse more profoundly the significance of a “Piedmont”-type 
function in passive revolutionsi.e. the fact that a state replaces the local social groups in 
leading a struggle of renewal. It is one of the cases in which these groups have the function of 
“domination” without that of “leadership”: dictatorship without hegemony (Gramsci, 1971: 
105-6, Q15§59). 
The significance of the French Revolution was highlighted in terms of its geopolitical impact on the 
states-system, ‘which spilled over into the rest of Europe with the republican and Napoleonic 
armiesgiving the old régimes a powerful shove, and resulting not in the immediate collapse as in 
France but in the “reformist” corrosion of them which lasted up to 1870’ (Gramsci, 1971: 119, 
Q10§I9). The Italian form of passive revolution in the appearance of the Risorgimento ‘was a 
question of stitching together a unitary state’ (Gramsci, 2007: 77, Q6§89). ‘The concept of passive 
revolution, it seems to me’, Gramsci (1996: 232, Q4§57) accordingly stated, ‘applies not only to Italy 
but also to those countries that modernise the state through a series of reforms.’  
There are at least two different but linked processes defining the essential form of the 
condition of passive revolution. It can refer to: 
1) a revolution without mass participation, or a ‘revolution from above’, involving elite-
engineered social and political reform that draws on foreign capital and associated ideas 
while lacking a national-popular base. Passive revolution here describes the ‘historical fact 
of the absence of popular initiative in the development of Italian history’ (Gramsci 2007: 
252, Q8§25) and how issues such as agrarian reform were ‘a way of grafting the agrarian 
masses on to the national revolution’ (Gramsci, 2007: 257, Q8§35); and 
2) how a revolutionary form of political transformation is pressed into a conservative project 
of restoration in which popular demands of class struggle still play some role. It refers here 
to, ‘the fact that “progress” occurs as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic 
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and incoherent rebelliousness of the popular massesa reaction consisting of 
“restorations” that agree to some part of the popular demands and are therefore 
“progressive restorations”, or “revolutions-restorations”, or even “passive revolutions”’ 
(Gramsci, 2007: 252, Q8§25). 
In the latter sense, passive revolution is linked to insurrectionary mass mobilisation from below 
while such class demands are restricted so that ‘changes in the world of production are 
accommodated within the current social formation’ (Sassoon, 1987: 207; see Femia, 1981: 260n.74). 
As Gramsci (1996: 360, Q5§119) notes in the case of the Risorgimento, ‘the bourgeoisie did not lead 
the people or seek its help to defeat feudal privileges; instead, it was the aristocracy that formed a 
strong party made up of people opposed to unbridled exploitation by the industrial bourgeoisie and 
to the consequences of industrialism’. In Italy, the ruling class systematically prevented the 
emergence of a ‘new structure from below’ and ever since ‘has made the preservation of this 
crystallised situation the raison d’être of its historical continuity’ (Gramsci, 2007: 121-2, Q6§162). 
Perhaps for that reason, it was noted that there was a ‘congenital incapacity’ within the Partito 
d’Azione to exercise leadership while the Partito Moderato resorted to a form of ‘“political-economic 
neo-Malthusianism”’ to block substantive agrarian reform (Gramsci, 1996: 181, Q3§125). The 
contradictory combination of revolution-restoration that is emblematic of a passive revolution is 
therefore that of an insurrectionary force domesticated (Morton, 2010a: 330). Or, to turn to the 
primary source, the theory of passive revolution as revolution-restoration refers to a ‘domesticated 
dialectic’ within the struggle-driven process of historical development (Gramsci, 2007: 372, Q8§225; 
Gramsci, 2007: 253, Q8§27). This does not mean that passive revolutions are consciously made by 
capitalists themselves; rather the emphasis is shifted to the effects of transformations constituting 
capitalism as a mode of production and the consolidation of modern state power (Callinicos, 1989: 
124). The forms of appearance that passive revolutions may take do not imply inert, literally passive, 
processes. Everyday forms of passive revolution can be violent and brutal, the outcome neither 
predetermined nor inevitable. Hence, beyond the form of appearance of the Italian Risorgimento, a 
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chain of passive revolutions called forth by capitalist modernity throughout the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century may be identified, marking passive revolution as an essential form in the historical 
sociology of state-making processes. It indicates a description of capitalist modernity where there is 
a structural inability of the bourgeois political project to realise fully the practice of hegemony, 
delivering an incomplete process that becomes more the rule rather than the exception of state 
formation (Thomas, 2009: 154; Thomas, 2013: 25). Albeit without the direct intent of a bourgeois 
class, these processes of state formation have often culminated in the persistence of old regimes in 
the latter half of the nineteenth-century and, in the twentieth-century, the failure of hegemony in 
peripheral capitalist modernity notwithstanding the partial molecular absorption and redefinition of 
class interests from below (Endnotes, 2015: 86, 100; Mayer, 1981/2010; and, for example, Allinson 
and Anievas, 2010; Gray, 2014; Hesketh, 2017a; Munck, 2013; Roberts, 2015; Webber, 2016). 
Regardless of the form of appearance or the essential content of a passive revolution, it is 
crucial to appreciate the role of class struggles over the political form of the state. The 
developmental unevenness of social property relations are open-ended rather than closed or 
ensnared within the structures of passive revolution and its logic of absorption. ‘The thesis of the 
“passive revolution” as an interpretation of the Risorgimento’, Gramsci acknowledged, ‘and of every 
epoch characterised by complex historical upheavals . . . [is in] danger of historical defeatism . . . 
since the whole way of posing the question may induce a belief in some kind of fatalism’ (Gramsci, 
1971: 114, Q15§62). Two factors can therefore be underscored to account for social change or 
contradictions and conflict within the theory of passive revolution. First, the concept of passive 
revolution ‘remains a dialectical onein other words, presupposes, indeed postulates as necessary, a 
vigorous antithesis which can present intransigently all the potentialities for development’ (Gramsci, 
1971: 114, Q15§62). This means emphasising the very contradictions of revolution-restoration and 
the role of popular masses in shaping the form and content of passive revolutions against state 
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classes. The flow of organic and conjunctural movements within the structures of passive revolution 
are ultimately conditioned by the ‘relations of forces’ between contending class factions (Gramsci, 
1971: 177-85, Q13§17). Second, in developing the theory of passive revolution, Gramsci (2007: 357, 
Q8§210) posed himself the following question: ‘Should one regard as “revolutions” all those 
movements that describe themselves as “revolutions” in order to endow themselves with dignity and 
legitimacy?’ In response, passive revolution is offered not only as an analysis of the specificity of 
Italian historical development (form of appearance) but also as a consideration of state formation 
conditions (essential form) through a method of historical analogy as an interpretative criterion 
(Gramsci, 1971: 54n.4, Q25§2; Gramsci, 1971: 114, Q15§62). Gramsci’s analysis of the specificity of 
Italian historical development and its form of appearance of passive revolution is thus developed 
‘not as a programme . . . but as a criterion of interpretation, in the absence of other active elements 
to a dominant extent’ (Gramsci, 1971: 114, Q15§62). The explicative power of this method of 
interpreting state formation and the contradictions of class struggle therefore lies in ‘the method of 
historical analogy as an interpretative criterion’ (Gramsci, 1971: 54n.4, Q25§2). As argued elsewhere 
(Morton 2007b: 604-5), Gramsci derives certain principles of historical research linked to the 
circumstances of Italian state formation while comparingthrough historical analogydifferent 
historical processes and, therein, the particular configuration of class struggles over the political 
form of state and capitalist modernity. Within the conceptualisation of passive revolution, then, 
there lies an alternative interpretative theory of the history of modern state formation, the making of 
revolutions, and the contradictions of class struggle. As a summing up of the internally related 
dimensions of uneven and combined development and passive revolution, Chris Hesketh (2017b: 
15) states ‘the universal pressures generated by capitalist geopolitical competition are acknowledged 
but the geographical seats of class articulation remain the priority for analysis’. 
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Our argument, then, is that it is now possible to appreciate the concept and condition of 
passive revolution as a lateral field of causality to the structuring condition of uneven and combined 
development. This means that the concrete consideration of instances of passive revolution brings 
forth an engagement with state and subaltern class forces as agents that have been crucial in the 
making of modern states and transitions to capitalism. The concept of passive revolution offers a 
mode of theorising both the inner dynamics of capitalist modernity within states across space and 
time and how these processes of developmental catch-up are internally related to the geopolitical 
pressures of the states-system. Passive revolutions are therefore a working through of pre-
established sovereignties that may both transform (revolution) and sustain (restoration) the change-
inducing strains brought about by a transformation in social property relations. Hence we can: 
propose the category of passive revolution as an equivalent political form to a production 
process that privileged suborning what was useful at hand to serve capital’s pursuit of 
surplus value and along the way produce continuing economic unevenness [that] modern 
nation-states were pledged to eliminate (Harootunian, 2015: 131). 
The challenge, accordingly, is to appreciate ‘processes of passive revolution as specific instances of 
state transition that are internally related through the general world-historical conditions of uneven 
and combined development’ (Morton, 2007a: 71, original emphasis). 
 
Conclusion: passive revolution as the political rule of capital 
Existing conceptualisations of uneven and combined development provide a static spatial 
countenance, which means that they are predominantly remiss in providing analysis of the causal 
effects of capitalist development. One consequence is that uneven and combined development 
approaches have been reluctant to deliver concrete accounts of the changing dynamics of 
developmental unevenness across space and time. For that reason the chronotope of passive 
revolution—a category functioning across space and time—has been presented in this article as a 
concept and condition that has an affinity with the theory of uneven and combined development 
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but without the erasure of agency. Said otherwise, uneven and combined development as the 
structuring condition and passive revolution with its emphasis on class agency are affinal and 
internally related concepts addressing how capitalist development unfolds and how class struggles 
between state and subaltern agents have produced and transformed space across time throughout 
variegated cycles of revolution and restoration. Passive revolution therefore provides a lateral field 
of causality or way of working through the internal dialectical relation between inherited processes 
of state formation and those ensuing class struggles that result from transformations in social 
property relations. How the force of capital—through its uneven and combined expansion on a 
world-scale—comes to change the meaning of the production of space and place through variegated 
passive revolutions is therefore significant in attempting to address the different functions of 
capitalist space across time (Morton, 2017b). Instantiations of passive revolution are not part of a 
transhistorical universalisation but are, rather, part of a historically specific set of processes that exist 
within particular and local conditions. For that reason, this article has underscored the multilinear 
dialectic of uneven and combined development and the passive revolutionary road to modernity as 
internally related aspects of the same whole. The particularities of the form of appearance of passive 
revolution in producing and transforming space within local conditions, as part of the generalising 
essential form of passive revolutions marking state formation processes within uneven and 
combined developmental circumstances, are therefore significant internally related aspects of 
capital’s entrance into modernity. As Gramsci (2007: 357, Q8§210) stated, writing in 1932, ‘the 
whole of historical materialism is a response to this question’, namely, ‘whether the processes of 
nature and history are invariably “evolutionary” or could also include “leaps”’. Developmental catch-
up is therefore very much about the spatial processes through which states and classes are 
‘compelled to make leaps’ (Trotsky 1936/1980: 28). For Gramsci (1996: 180, Q4§38, emphases 
added) writing earlier in 1930: 
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In real history, these moments become entangled with one another, horizontally and 
vertically; that is through economic activity (horizontally) and territory (vertically) combining 
and diverging in various ways. And each of these combinations may be represented by its own 
organised economic and political expression. It is also necessary to bear in mind that 
international relations become intertwined with these internal relations of a nation-state, and 
this, in turn, creates peculiar and historically concrete combinations. An ideology born in a 
highly developed country is disseminated in a less developed country and has an effect on 
the local interplay of combinations. 
Passive revolution is therefore the essential form of this expression of historical geographical 
restructuring that illuminates the spatial and temporal practices of state and class agents. To enforce 
this argument three points will tally up this conclusion. 
First, capturing the expression of capitalist expansion through passive revolution, it was 
Gramsci (1971: 116, Q15§62) who stated that such instances unfold when, ‘the impetus of progress 
is not tightly linked to a vast local economic development . . . but is instead the reflection of 
international developments which transmit their ideological currents to the periphery—currents 
born of the productive development of the more advanced countries’. But it would be thoughtless 
to dismiss this as a straightforward diffusionist argument. For example, Gramsci (1996: 204, Q4§49) 
states elsewhere, again in 1930, that ‘the Germans and the French provided the protoplasm of 
Russian history with a strong skeleton’ but the assimilation of such influences was undertaken by 
‘Russifying them’. In the same passage, it is acknowledged that ‘on another terrain and in quite 
different temporal and spatial conditions, this Russian phenomenon can be compared to the birth of 
the American nation (the United States)’ that ‘continued to develop the forces implicit in its nature 
but at an incomparably faster pace than in old Europe’ (Gramsci 1996: 205, Q4§49). As Trotsky 
crafted this correlation subsequently, ‘the European colonists in America did not begin history all 
over again from the beginning’. Hence: 
Although compelled to follow after the advanced countries, a backward country does not 
take things in the same order. The privilege of historical backwardness—and such a privilege 
exists—permits, or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any 
specified date, skipping a whole of series of intermediate stages (Trotsky 1936/1980: 27). 
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Second, likewise, it was also Gramsci who expounded on the peculiar combination of different 
stages of uneven development to define the historically specific process of capitalism. Again in 1930 
he wrote:  
Just as methods of traction did not pass directly from the animal-drawn stagecoach to 
modern electrical express trains but went through a series of “intermediate combinations” 
some of which still exist (such as animal traction on tracks, etc., etc.), and just as railway 
stock that has become obsolete in the United States remains in use for many years in China 
where it represents technical progress—so also in the cultural sphere diverse ideological 
strata are variously combined, and what has become “scrap iron” in the city is still an 
“implement” in the provinces. Indeed, in the cultural sphere, “explosions” are even less 
frequent and less intense than in the technical sphere . . . The allusion to the fact that 
sometimes what has become “scrap iron” in the city is still an “implement” in the provinces 
can be developed usefully. The relations between urban population and rural population are 
not always the same (Gramsci 1992: 129, Q1§43). 
Third, this focus on the pathfinders of capitalist development was put less coarsely when compared 
to some renditions. The evocative but maladroit Trotsky therefore wrote that ‘savages throw away 
their bows and arrows for rifles all at once, without travelling the road which lay between those two 
weapons in the past’ (Trotsky 1936/1980: 27). By contrast, the orbit of capitalist expansion is posed 
as a question by Gramsci to his former mentor, Antonio Labriola.1 It was in one of the latter’s 
lectures on pedagogy that the topic ‘How would you go about the moral education of a Papuan?’ 
emerged. In recounting this story, Gramsci indicates that the reply from Labriola was, 
“Provisionally, I would make him a slave, and that would be the pedagogy in his case; but then I’d 
want to see whether it would be possible to start using something of our pedagogy with his 
grandsons and great-grandsons”. Gramsci crafts his analysis otherwise: 
It seems to me that historically the problem should be formulated differently, that is: 
whether a nation or social group that has reached a higher level of civilisation can (and 
therefore should) “accelerate” the civil education of the more backward nations and social 
groups, universalising its own experience. In short, it seems to me that the mode of thinking 
encapsulated in Labriola’s reply is not dialectical or progressive but somewhat reactionary 
(Gramsci 2007: 349-50, Q8§200). 
                                                 
1 Trotsky emphasised that one of his foremost philosophical influences on materialist dialectics was, 
indeed, Antonio Labriola, see Trotsky (1930/1970: 167-8, 170-1, 177). 
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In sum in this 1932 note, Gramsci highlights that a focus on external discipline—the whip of 
external necessity—to coerce a ‘backward people’ and reduce them to slavery would be reductive. 
Instead, the process of proletarianisation—what he refers to as ‘the concept of a “labour army”’—
would indicate that ‘there is no need to resort to “slavery” or to colonialism as a “mechanically” 
inevitable historical stage, etc.’ (Gramsci 2007: 350, Q8§200). It would therefore be mistaken to 
grasp onto the theoretical purity of a single thinker on the geopolitical unevenness and socially 
combined character of development. Rather, the theory of passive revolution affords further insight 
into the uneven social development and worldwide spread of capitalism in its combination with, and 
internal relation to, the geopolitical consolidation of the modern state. Passive revolution is 
therefore the essential form of this expression of historical geographical restructuring that 
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